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MIGRANT NETWORKS AND POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Abstract 
This paper examines the hypothesis that migration might enhance the demand for 
political improvements both by migrants and migrant’s networks. We use individual-
level survey and behavioral data that were collected during the 2009 elections in 
Mozambique to show that the proportion of migrants in a village improves the demand 
for political accountability not only through migrants themselves but also their 
networks. Whereas the interest in politics is driven by the amount of migrants in the 
geographical network, the transmission of democratic ideas seems to be fostered by 
regular contact with migrant households. These results are robust when controlling for 
self-selection. 
Keywords: Migration; Effects of Emigration in Origin Countries; Political Institutions 
1. Introduction 
The economic importance of international migration has been increasing steadily 
in the recent decades. It is not only that the number of labor migrants has increased 
massively, but also that the financial flows generated by these migrants have been rising 
rapidly, often surpassing the national budget resources of many developing countries. 
As a result, a new strand of economics literature has been growing and examining the 
positive effects of emigration on the economic development of origin countries. 
The positive effects of emigration on economic development may happen as a 
result of a number of mechanisms. First, remittances may provide the financial 
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resources to overcome credit constraints in sending countries, as described by Edwards 
and Ureta (2003) and Yang (2008). Second, return migration may bring not only 
financial resources, but also human capital, which may promote entrepreneurship and 
economic growth, as in Mesnard and Ravallion (2006) and Batista, McIndoe-Calder, 
and Vicente (2013). Third, migrant networks foster increased Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and international trade, as found by Javorcik et al (2011) and Rauch and Trindade 
(2002). Fourth, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) and Batista, Lacuesta, and 
Vicente (2012) empirically supported the hypothesis of a “brain gain” rather than a 
“brain drain”, i.e. the possibility that emigration promotes capital accumulation. 
One area that has deserved less attention is the relationship between migration 
and the quality of political institutions. The importance of good political institutions for 
economic development is by now well established, as influentially described by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). However, empirical evidence on the impact 
of emigration on the quality of political institutions in origin countries is scarce, and 
there are only a few recent contributions.  
Spilimbergo (2009) conducted one of the first studies on the effects of migration 
on democratization by examining the impact of foreign education acquired in 
democratic countries on democracy in student origin countries. He showed that 
migration may promote democracy but left the question unanswered as to which 
specific mechanisms underlie this effect. 
Docquier et al. (2011) present cross-country evidence of the positive impact of 
unskilled emigration from developing countries to OECD countries on the institutional 
quality of origin countries by using aggregate measures of democracy and economic 
freedom. They find significant institutional gains from the “brain drain” over the long 
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run after considering incentive effects on human capital formation, and attribute these 
effects to an increase of the home country population's exposure to democratic values 
and norms.  
These earlier empirical contributions use aggregate macroeconomic data and 
explore cross-country variation. Hence, they cannot distinguish between supply and 
demand forces nor capture in detail the mechanisms underlying the effects they identify. 
On the contrary, Batista and Vicente (2011) use individual-level variation from a 
tailored household survey, and behavioral data for a single country. This allows them to 
discriminate between the impact of return and current migrants on individual-level 
political attitudes. While this approach represents an improvement over earlier work in 
the sense that it uses micro data to learn more about the impact of migration on the 
quality of political institutions, as well as pointing towards return migration as the 
driving force for these effects, it would be important to learn more precisely about how 
individual-level relationships with migrants affect the demand for political institutions. 
That is the main objective of this paper. 
We focus on the hypothesis that international migration raises the level of 
information about political processes of voters in origin countries through a greater 
exposure to democratic values and norms. This increase in the information level will 
affect the beliefs of voters and therefore change their political attitudes and political 
participation. We assume that this effect will not only occur for return migrants, but also 
trigger peer effects - thus influencing the social network of current and return migrants, 
although these effects will be potentially different.  
The diffusion effect of political values through social networks has been 
previously investigated by Fafchamps, Vaz and Vicente (2012), who showed that 
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increasing the political literacy of experiment participants not only influences targeted, 
but also untargeted individuals’ electoral behavior - where “untargeted” individuals did 
not receive civic education during a randomized control trial. 
To test our hypothesis that migration may improve information, and thereby 
political participation and the quality of political institutions, and whether this process 
happens via social networks, we estimate a heterogeneous reinforcement effect model. 
If an individual is connected to one or more migrants in some way this will be captured 
in our econometric model – the estimation model encompasses different ways through 
which individuals may be connected to migrants, i.e. different types of networks. The 
estimated network reinforcement effects are then tested by examining whether the effect 
on political participation is larger for more connected individuals.  
Using detailed network and behavioral data from Mozambique, we are able to 
measure the effect of social and geographical networks of migrants – both return and 
current migrants – on the quality of political institutions in their home country. Our 
dataset contains information on the characteristics of migrants and home country 
residents, on the political attitudes and political participation of residents in the 
countries of origin of migrants, and detailed data on the existence of connections and 
relationships between migrants and residents. Differentiating between intensity levels of 
networks (i.e. differentiating between family ties, frequent chatting, and geographical 
proximity) and individual characteristics, we can include heterogeneous effects in our 
estimations, and study in detail individual-level effects. 
Political outcomes of interest in this paper are measured by survey and 
behavioral responses concerning the interest in political processes, democratic 
preferences, and political participation. To evaluate in detail the different mechanisms 
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of migration and their channels, we use different measures of migration. First, we 
simply look at whether or not each respondent’s household has at least one member 
with migration experience. Second, we examine the degree of connectedness between 
the respondent and migrants within the respondents’ network. We differentiate between 
geographical networks, i.e. how many households with at least one migrant in the 
family exist in the respondent’s village, family networks, i.e. the proportion of family 
members with migration experience within this network, and chatting networks, i.e. the 
proportion of migrant households the respondent household regularly chats with.  
We estimate our model using ordinary least squares, controlling for individual 
and geographical effects. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude a self-selection bias if a 
respondent’s migration decision is correlated with his political attitudes. If this were the 
case, then our explanatory variables would be correlated with the error term due to a 
simultaneity problem and our results will suffer from endogeneity. As the migration 
experience (the ‘migration treatment’) is not randomly assigned to survey respondents, 
we thus could not determine the direction of causality between migration and political 
attitudes. We address this potential endogeneity bias by using instrumental variables 
that exploit ‘quasi-natural experiments’ given by natural catastrophes. 
Our results confirm the findings by Batista and Vicente (2011) that the 
proportion of migrants in a village is correlated with a behavioral measure of the 
demand for political accountability. By offering survey respondents the possibility to 
send a text message with suggestions for policy priorities during the president’s 
mandate, we interpret the actual action of doing so as a measure of political 
participation. Our estimates suggest that this measure might be related to the 
significantly different democratic values of migrants, and to their increased interest in 
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political issues. We find that this not only holds for the respondents with migration 
experience themselves but also observe an indirect effect on individual survey 
respondents through their networks. Whereas the interest in political issues is mainly 
driven by the amount of migrants in the geographical network, the transmission of 
democratic ideas seems to be fostered if respondents are in regular, intense contact with 
migrant households – either through regular chatting or through family relations. These 
results are robust when using instrumental variables controlling for self-selection. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
country context under which the empirical part of this study was carried out. Section 3 
presents a theoretical framework to model how migratory experiences of the individual 
or others in his network may influence his political attitudes. Next, Section 4 proposes 
an econometric model and estimation strategy for the effects of interest. Section 5 
follows with an introduction to the dataset and its descriptive statistics. Finally, Section 
6 presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Country Context: Mozambique 
Mozambique is a country in Eastern Africa, considered to be one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a GDP per capita of only 1.020$PPP in 2012.1 Despite its 
high growth rates of 4.791% on average between 1980 and 2012, Mozambique is still 
ranking on place 185 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index.2  
After its independence from Portugal in 1975, as a result of ten years of war, 
Mozambique was led by the independence movement FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação 
de Moçambique) under a single-party, socialist regime. Only two years after 
                                                
1 World Bank. 
2 Mozambique’s HDI actually declined between 1980 and 2012 by -0.7% to 0.327, UNDP (2013). 
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independence had been negotiated, the country suffered a civil war led by RENAMO 
(Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), that was mainly supported by Apartheid South 
Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). With the end of the cold war and apartheid 
collapsing, FRELIMO and RENAMO started first negotiations that resulted in a new 
constitution allowing for a multi-party system, and a peace treatment being signed in 
1992. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This paper focuses on changes in political attitudes and participation due to 
migration, depending on the specific characteristics of the relationship between 
migrants and their networks – be it through family relations, regular chatting or just the 
geographical proximity to somebody with migration experience. Following the 
traditional literature on electoral participation, the decision to participate in political 
processes can be formalized, as summarized by Dhillon and Peralta (2002), by 
modeling political participation as the outcome of an expected cost-benefit analysis. We 
assume that an individual i takes an action vector xi (for example casting a vote, reading 
the newspaper, gathering information about political parties) to maximize its payoff 
function: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥!!𝐸!!𝑈 𝐺 𝑥! , 𝑥!! , 𝑥! − 𝑐𝑥! (3.1) 
where 𝐺(𝑥! , 𝑥!!) is the outcome of the electoral process (that can be discounted by the 
perceived likelihood that one’s vote will make a difference), x-i is the combined action 
of all individuals other than i, Ω! is the information set available to the individual, and 
cxi is the cost of taking the action. The individual therefore maximizes its expected 
utility of taking a certain action given the individual’s action and the action of 
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everybody else. The vector xi is allowed to enter the utility function independently from 
the voting process G to reflect non-instrumental motivations. We can thereby include 
the possibility that some individuals might participate in political processes not because 
they actually behave according to their interest in politics but because of social pressure 
or conformity. 
The solution of the maximization problem yields that the individual’s expected 
payoff has to be at least as high as the cost of action so that he/she is indifferent 
between participating or not. In this dataset the cost can be reflected for example by the 
monetary cost of sending the text message but also by the time needed to get to the next 








= 𝑐  (3.2) 
If migration changes the information set Ω! available to the individual so that the 
voter has a better understanding of the the election process or values democratic 







 will increase. Similarly, the 
left-hand term will increase if utility from non-instrumental motivations increases as a 
higher fraction of migrants (with higher democratic values) lives close to the individual. 
If the latter is the case, then there exists a diffusion effect for non-migrants (i.e. the 
political attitudes of the migrant are passed over to its peers) or a reinforcement effect 
for return migrants (i.e. the migrant’s own experience is intensified if shared with other 
migrants in some way). As this paper focuses on network effects, individual diffusion 
effects (i.e. the mechanics how political ideas are passed over from one individual to 
another) are not analyzed in detail. Nevertheless, the network effects caused by current 
migrants reflect the idea of diffusion effects. 
9 
4. Estimation Strategy 
To test our hypotheses, we build an econometric model based on the theoretical 
framework described in the previous section. The relationship between emigration and 
political attitudes is estimated for three different outcome variables that reflect the 
respondents’ interest for politics, their democratic values, and their demand for political 
accountability. The voting behavior (or more generally political participation) can be 
estimated with the following latent variable model: 
𝑉! = 1 𝑉!∗ ≥ 0  (4.1) 
𝑉!∗ = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑀! + 𝛾!
!
!
𝑞!"!!! + 𝛿!𝑋! + 𝜀!  (4.2) 
According to the model, the respondent will vote (or participate) if the net 
expected benefit from voting, 𝑉!∗ , is non-negative. The net expected benefit is 
influenced by the individual’s migration experience, denoted by the dummy variable 
𝑀!, and the fraction of migrants in the respondent’s network,  
!
!
𝑞!"!!! , as well as by a 
vector of individual and geographical characteristics 𝑋! . The form of the network 
variable depends on the specific network type under evaluation – either the 
geographical, the chatting or the kinship network. Variable 𝑞!" indicates whether or not 
two respondents live in the same EA, regularly chat with each other, or have a family 
relationship, respectively, and if respondent j is a migrant (or stems from a household 
with a current migrant).  
To further understand which determinants of political attitudes are influenced by 
a migrant’s experiences, we are not only interested in the demand for political 
accountability but also in the respondent’s interest for politics, and his/her democratic 
values. To estimate these effects we define yi as a measure of political interest or 
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democratic values obtained through survey questions using Likert scales on different 
statements on democracy and interest in politics as described in detail in the next 
section. Following a similar estimation strategy as above we can estimate the model 
given below: 
𝑦! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑀! + 𝛾!
!
!
𝑞!"!!! + 𝛿!𝑋! + 𝜀!  (4.3) 
The degree of connectedness with migrants is given by the fraction of migrants 
connected with individual i over the total number of sampled neighbors. Coefficient 𝛾! 
then indicates how the degree of connectedness with migrants affects the outcome of 
political attitudes. Note that we differentiate between the total effect of migration and a 
more detailed definition of the respective networks. The first specification includes both 
current and return migrants. This implies that the effect of the fraction of migrants in a 
respondent’s network consists of direct effects through return migrants and indirect 
effects through current migrants. In the second specification we differentiate between 
the network effects from households with current migrants, and the network effects of 
directly talking with return migrants. This differentiation allows us to explore secondary 
effects: the effect of a current migrant through a third person that lives not in the 
household of a respondent but is part of the respondent’s network. 
Our estimation model further includes a vector of individual and locality specific 
controls, 𝑋!, including demographic controls such as age or schooling years as well as 
household specific characteristics as for example access to information schemes as 
radios, computers or TVs. At the locality level, we control for the turnout in the 2004 
elections as these might indicate a higher level of political participation in general, 
independently from the fraction of migrants in a village. We also include province fixed 
effects in all our regressions.  
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We first estimate our model by using ordinary least squares as other models 
such as ordinal logit or probit, run as robustness checks, yielded the same results. As 
stated in the previous section, migration might be correlated with an individual’s 
political attitudes if the decision to migrate directly depends on whether or not the 
individual is satisfied with the political situation in the country of origin. Even if we 
control for self-selection biases due to attained education as proposed in a wide range of 
literature on ‘brain gain’ effects, we still need to be concerned with selection biases due 
to potential simultaneity. In this instance, we cannot determine whether migration 
causes a change in political attitudes or rather the political attitudes lead a person to 
emigrate. This implies that our explanatory variable is correlated with the error term and 
that we face endogeneity problems. For this reason, we estimate our regressions with 
instrumental variables to tackle this issue. This strategy allows us to identify sources of 
variation that cannot possibly be determined by our outcome variable (political 
attitudes), nor be correlated with other variables affecting the outcome of interest. The 
instrumental variable is only correlated with our independent variable of interest, and 
thereby correlated with the dependent variable of interest only indirectly through the 
variable of interest. 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The household survey data used in this paper was collected in Mozambique 
from mid-September until mid-October around the 2009 elections by the CSAE at the 
University of Oxford. The four provinces covered by the survey are Cabo Delgado, 
Zambezia, Gaza and Maputo-Province. The survey’s sampling framework was the 2004 
electoral map of the country. Two-stage clustered representative sampling - first on 
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provinces, then on enumeration areas (EA) – was used. The data set contains a total of 
161 EAs – including 1763 respondents, approximately 11 per enumeration area. The 
interviews targeted the household head or his/her spouse and were conditional on 
‘having access to a cell phone’ to receive or send messages (this included having access 
to a neighbor’s or family member’s phone). This condition was necessary for our 
behavioral measure on the demand for political accountability as it required the ability 
to send a text message. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To reflect the importance and magnitude of migration in Mozambique, Table 1 
illustrates the percentage of households with migrants in the data set. It shows that 
almost 33% of all households have at least one migrant. This increases to 53.49% for 
the Southern Provinces (Maputo and Gaza) and decreases to 11.71% in the Northern 
Provinces (Zambezia and Cabo Delgado). Around 16% of all households have at least 
one current migrant – this number is not representative for all current migrants living 
outside of Mozambique as the dataset does not provide any information on current 
migrants that left the country together with their whole families. The households with at 
least one return migrant make up for 23.03% of all households in the dataset. 
5.2 Description of Variables of Interest 
Our outcome variables are concerned with measuring the effect of migration and 
migrant’s networks on political attitudes and behavior – looking in particular at 
variables such as interest in political issues, democratic values and political behavior, 
reflecting the demand for political accountability. 
To measure an individual’s interest in political issues we asked the respondent to 
indicate, on a Likert scale from 1 to 4, the level of interest in public matters concerning 
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politics and the government, with 1 having no interest at all and 4 being very interested. 
As the survey was conducted around the 2009 presidential, national and provincial 
elections, we are also able to differentiate between the interest for these elections 
separately. Nevertheless, as the results are consistent for all four questions we opt to 
only show the first outcome on the general interest in political issues. We furthermore 
asked for the preferences towards single- or multi-party systems by letting respondents 
agree or disagree with the statement that only one party should rule. A negative 
response (i.e. disagreement) therefore suggests a higher preference for more democratic 
systems. To obtain an actual behavioral measure we asked respondents to send a text 
message suggesting policy priorities for the president’s mandate. Each message implied 
a small cost (for sending the message) therefore representing a costly action and 
allowing to interpret the sending of a message as an incentive compatible measure of 
demand for political accountability. We estimate these measures while controlling for a 
wide range of individual characteristics, as well as province controls as mentioned 
above.  
The main interest of this paper is the effect of migrant’s networks on political 
measures - rather than the effect of migration on an individual’s political attitudes. 
Nevertheless, we control for the effect of migration itself and include in our estimations 
whether or not one of the respondent’s household members has migration experience. 
The network variables are constructed in such a way that we can differentiate between 
the network effect according to the social proximity of two respondents. This means 
that we not only evaluate the overall fraction of migrants in an individual’s geographical 
network (i.e. within the same EA) but also the fraction of migrants in an individuals 
chatting and kinship network. The chatting and kinship networks indicate how many 
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individuals with whom the respondent regularly chats with or has a family relation are 
migrants. Within the respective network we distinguish between current and return 
migrants, whereas the relation with a return migrant is a direct one and the relation with 
a current migrant an indirect one via the household head or its spouse. The degree of 
connectedness with migrants is then calculated according to this classification as the 
number of migrants the household is connected to over the respondent’s whole network, 
i.e. all the respondents of the respective enumeration area. 
6. Empirical Results 
In this section, the main empirical results are summarized. We will first look at 
the OLS estimates for the underlying determinants such as interest and democratic 
values before we turn to the final results showing how emigration may affects the 
demand for political accountability. 
6.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimations 
6.1.1 Interest in Matters of Public Concern 
The survey question under examination in this sub-section targeted the level of 
interest of the respondent for public matters, especially concerning political issues 
affecting daily life. Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from one to four if 
they have no interest at all or are very interested.  
The results for the direct individual effect of emigration on a respondent’s 
interest together with the effect of a larger fraction of migrants in his/her geographical 
network are presented in column (1) of Table 2. Controlling for individual and locality 
effects there seems to be a strongly significant correlation between respondent’s 
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migration experience and their interest for politics, as well as between individuals with 
a higher proportion of migrants in their network and the dependent variable. The first of 
the explanatory variables shows that having a migrant in the household, positively 
correlates with the respondent’s interest in public matters – thus that migrants are more 
interested in political processes than non-migrants. This result confirms our 
expectations of a positive relation between migration and political attitudes in the sense 
that migrants are more aware of political processes. Nevertheless, our second variable 
suggests that this relation is actually negative and even larger for respondents that live 
in villages with more migrants, especially if these migrants are return migrants.  
This result could be caused by a self-selection problem due to the fact that 
individuals that are less happy with the political situation or less convinced that any 
kind of effort (such as showing interest in politics) will have an effect on actual political 
outcomes, could be more likely to emigrate.3 If we consider the problematic political 
past of Mozambique, it seems reasonable that we find this kind of effect for return 
migrants as these are more likely to have suffered from political unrest at the time of 
migration. Another explanation could be that a higher fraction of migrants in the village 
implies better ‘outside options’ in the sense that future migrants can benefit from the 
networks abroad that have been established by former (now return) migrants. They 
therefore have less incentives to actually care about political issues going on in their 
home country. This problem will be tackled in the next section by estimating the model 
                                                
3 Indeed, emigration may hurt the quality of home country institutions if it is considered to be a ‘safety 
valve’. In this instance, unhappy individuals leave their home countries and this mechanism undermines 
the demand for political accountability and decreases the capacity to supply political institutions of a 
better quality - if those leaving are also the ones more capable of providing these services. 
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with instrumental variables. Note that we do not observe significant results for neither 
the chatting nor the kinship network (presented in columns (3) – (6)), but that the 
individual direct effect is consistently significant and positive as suggested. 
6.1.2 Democratic Values: Preference for Single-Party Systems 
The following section discusses the relation between migration and the 
preference of single-party systems over multi-party systems. Survey respondents were 
asked to declare how much they agree (or disagree) with the statement that just one 
party should be able to rule. Therefore, the signs have to be read in reverse, i.e. a 
negative coefficient suggests a higher preference for multi-party systems. The results 
are illustrated in the following Table 3.  
As above, we find ambiguous results for the impact of migration. Households 
with at least one migrant clearly prefer multi-party systems, thus preferring more 
democratic systems. However, the sign changes for respondents that live in villages 
with a higher proportion of migrants. This seems to be especially strong if the survey 
respondent regularly chats to more return migrants. This result is puzzling as we would 
expect a reinforcement effect to be of the same direction as the actual direct effect of 
migration. Especially, as our results suggest that the fraction of current migrants is 
positively correlated with the preferences for multi-party systems. These findings 
propose again that there might be a self-selection bias in such a way that causes people 
with a worse opinion about democracy to leave their home country that does not apply 
to current migrants anymore. We furthermore find that these effects are statistically 
significant for family relatives suggesting that political attitudes in terms of democratic 
values are passed on to non-migrants if the two individuals have a relationship that 
allows them to regularly talk to each other. That this effect for current migrants only 
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occurs in the kinship network seems reasonable as regular chatting with migrants via 
non-family members is more difficult and probably also less likely. Despite the 
ambiguous signs our results thus suggest that an individual’s attitude toward democratic 
norms is influenced by migration and that this not only holds for the migrant himself 
but also for its peers.  
6.1.3 Demand for Political Accountability 
This last section evaluates whether the above effects actually result in a higher 
demand for political accountability as suggested before. Table 4 summarizes the results 
for a measure of behavior where respondents could send a text message with 
suggestions for policy priorities during the president’s mandate. If the respondent did 
send a text message, we interpret it as a higher demand for better political institutions 
and a greater political participation.  
Our results suggest that there is a positive relation between the fraction of 
current migrants in a respondents geographical and chatting network but that there is no 
direct effect of migration itself. Again, the fraction of return migrants seems to have a 
negative impact but we cannot exclude that this is not due to a selection bias.  
6.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
As described before, we might face a selection bias if individuals that are, for 
example, less interested in political issues opt to emigrate to another country more often 
than people with a higher interest. Especially for Mozambique the ongoing political 
instability, high corruption, and low level of democracy might affect people in their 
decision to leave the country. If this is the case, then our explanatory variable of interest 
is not exogenous anymore but might be correlated with the error term. 
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We therefore use instrumental variables to estimate the relationships stated 
above. As instruments we chose the exogenous variation given by the proximity to war 
centers during the independence and the civil war, as well as natural catastrophes such 
as storms, droughts or plagues affecting harvests or cattle that are often the livelihood of 
many families, as especially in rural areas there exist almost no income sources from 
salaried work. The dataset for the instrumental variables provides detailed data on 
catastrophes4 in Mozambique on a district level, allowing for large variation between 
EAs.  
Table 5 shows the results for a 2SLS estimation using the instruments discussed 
above - namely if there was a storm, drought or plague in the respondent’s district after 
he/she turned 17, and the distance to war centers. The instruments behave well as they 
are strongly correlated with the regressors, and independent from the error term  - which 
can be confirmed by their good performance in the weak identification test and the 
overidentification test using the Hansen J statistics. However, the instruments are not 
strong enough to show the combined effect, consisting of the individual direct effect 
and the network effect, as the different measures may be too correlated with each other 
to still provide the necessary correlation with each of the endogenous variables. Table 5 
therefore illustrates the direct individual effect in column (1) and the respective network 
effects in column (2) to (4). We find that not only are our estimates significant and as 
expected positive for the direct migration effect but also that, using instrumental 
variables, we obtain significant positive results for our network variables as well.  
Table 6 confirms these results for our measure of democratic values – the 
preference for multi-party systems. Even if instruments are performing slightly worse 
                                                
4 The data was obtained from the DesInventar database, a joint project of UNDP, UNISDR and LA RED. 
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compared to the above estimations in Table 5, we still find that our estimations are 
robust and now more consistent given that the selection bias has been circumvented. We 
find that using instrumental variables, our results confirm the hypothesis that migration 
increases the support for democratic ideas such as multi-party systems in all cases. The 
effect is found to be especially strong for the kinship network suggesting that personal 
relationships matter strongly for how those ideas will be passed on. This is consistent 
with our results from the OLS estimations supporting the ideas stated above that a close 
relationship, implying regular intense contact, with migrants is favorable for democratic 
ideas to be passed on.  
Ultimately, Table 7 is summarizing the results for the instrumental variables 
estimation of our measure concerned with the demand for political accountability. We 
find our OLS results confirmed as the IV estimations suggest as well that there is a 
positive correlation between the fraction of migrants in an individual’s network and 
his/her demand for political accountability. These results seem to confirm that political 
participation is increased if social pressure from peers is build through regular chatting 
with individuals that emigrated but also through the sheer presence of individuals with a 
higher demand for political accountability.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper aimed at providing further insights on how, on an individual level, migration 
is correlated with political attitudes and participation. Despite a few existing studies 
conducting macroeconomic analysis on this relationship, it has been unclear what are 
the underlying mechanisms for a dispersion of democratic values and ideas. In this 
paper, we intended to answer a broad set of questions such as: Is it worth to send people 
abroad and then randomly bringing migrants back to their home countries? Should 
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scholarship schemes in developed countries support this? How much are peers affected 
by the migration experience of an individual? We seek to answer these questions by 
differentiating between different measures of political attitudes such as interest, 
opinions and actual participation.  
Our results suggest that political ideas can be learned when people migrate to other 
countries and that the obtained values might be passed on to peers. Nevertheless, the 
actual outcome we are interested in – the increase in the demand for political 
accountability as an important factor of development and growth – only emerges if there 
is enough group pressure. Or, in other words, if political participation becomes a social 
norm and not only an idea learned abroad. The effects seem to be mainly driven by 
secondary effects from current migrants. Respondents that talk to more people with a 
current migrant in their household are more prone to show a higher demand for political 
accountability. 
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Households with at least one migrant 32.44 53.49 11.71
Households with at least one current migrant 15.77 29.37 2.36
Households with at least one return migrant 23.03 36.23 10.02
Source: Survey by Batista et al (2011)
1
Southern Provinces: Maputo-Province & Gaza
2
Northern Provinces: Zambezia & Cabo Delgado
Table 2: Summary Statistics, All Households
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Favoring multi-party systems 1,586 3.56 1.80 1 5
Regular, open and honest elections 1,689 4.62 1.04 1 5
Interest in public matters 1,708 2.89 1.09 1 4
Discussing politics 1,747 1.74 0.76 1 3
Interest in presidential elections 1,739 3.13 1.03 1 4
Sending “open letter”, % 1,147 17.52 38.03 0 100
Explanatory Variable of Interest
Migrant Households, % 1,763 32.44 46.83 0 100
Degree of connectedness within geographical proximity, % 1,763 33.26 26.89 0 100
Degree of connectedness within kinship network, % 1,763 2.75 8.13 0 70
Degree of connectedness within chatting network, % 1,763 4.59 10.96 0 70
Geographical Controls
Province, Maputo, % 1,763 24.90 43.26 0 100
Province, Gaza, % 1,763 24.73 43.16 0 100
Province, Zambezia, % 1,763 24.96 43.29 0 100
Province, Cabo Delgado, % 1,763 25.41 43.55 0 100
Household Head Characteristics
Age, years 1,747 37.62 13.58 15 88
School duration, years 1,760 5.88 4.07 0 17
Gender, % 1,763 45.15 49.78 0 100
Household Economic Characteristics
HH expenditure, MZN per day 1,674 128.83 164.02 0 2,380.95
TV, PC or radio ownership, % 1,763 72.83 44.49 0 100
Frequency of religious activities 1,756 3.73 1.01 1 5





Table 2: OLS Regressions: Interest in Public Issues
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household 0.233*** 0.229*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.215*** 0.215***











Fraction of Migrants -0.442***
(0.168)
Fraction of Return Migrants -0.451**
(0.181)
















k Fraction of Migrants 0.371
(0.267)
Fraction of Return Migrants 0.115
(0.591)
















Fraction of Migrants -0.0616
(0.369)
Fraction of Return Migrants -0.373
(0.915)
Fraction of Current Mig. Hh 0.124
(0.549)
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2




Households with at least one migrant 32.44 53.49 11.71
Households with at least one current migrant 15.77 29.37 2.36
Households with at least one return migrant 23.03 36.23 10.02
Source: Survey by Batista et al (2011)
1
Southern Provinces: Maputo-Province & Gaza
2
Northern Provinces: Zambezia & Cabo Delgado
Table 3: OLS Regressions: Preference for Single Party Systems
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household -0.257** -0.249** -0.246** -0.258** -0.222** -0.231**











Fraction of migrants 0.555*
(0.293)
Fraction of return migrants 0.291
(0.313)
















k Fraction of migrants 0.414
(0.479)
Fraction of return migrants 3.425***
(1.078)
















Fraction of migrants -0.545
(-0.82)
Fraction of return migrants 2.749*
(1.65)
Fraction of current mig Hh -1.849*
(-1.84)
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses






Table 4: OLS Regressions: Demand for Political Accountability
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household -0.0311 -0.0313 -0.0415 -0.0411 -0.0380 -0.0366











Fraction of Migrants -0.0971
(0.0789)
Fraction of Return Migrants -0.278***
(0.0828)
















k Fraction of Migrants 0.121
(0.113)
Fraction of Return Migrants -0.197
(0.223)
















Fraction of Migrants 0.0754
(0.150)
Fraction of Return Migrants -0.227
(0.340)
Fraction of Current Mig. Hh 0.222
(0.216)
Observations 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: IV Estimation: Interest in Public Issues
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant Household 0.843***
(0.321)
Migs in Geo Network 2.821***
(0.997)
Migs in Chatting Network 4.647***
(1.537)
Migs in Kinship Network 7.187***
(2.437)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental Variables Storm Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&DroughtBirthyear&Plague Min Distance War Min Distance War Min Distance War
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Weak Ident (K-P F) 25.255 22.197 42.081 38.569
Hansen J (P-value) 0.8835 0.7033 0.7986 0.7209
Standard errors in parentheses








Table 6: IV Estimation: Preference for Single-Party Systems
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant Household -5.108***
(0.760)
Migs in Geo Network -5.636***
(0.647)
Migs in Chatting Network -28.57***
(5.031)
Migs in Kinship Network -48.48***
(9.108)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental Variables Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&StormBirthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456
Weak Ident (K-P F) 37.974 155.951 23.088 20.108
Hansen J (P-value) 0.9289 0.9697 0.3929 0.6382
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
5
Table 7: IV Estimation: Demand for Political Accountability
Coefficient
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant Household 0.301*
(0.159)
Migs in Geo Network 0.455**
(0.226)
Migs in Chatting Network 0.666*
(0.391)
Migs in Kinship Network 1.068
(0.678)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turnout Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental Variables Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&DroughtBirthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague
Observations 1048 1048 1048 1048
Weak Ident (K-P F) 19.750 44.731 47.281 38.690
Hansen J (P-value) 0.6186 0.7756 0.2751 0.2117
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, All Households
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Favoring multi-party systems 1,586 3.56 1.80 1 5
Interest in public matters 1,708 2.89 1.09 1 4
Sending “open letter”, % 1,147 17.52 38.03 0 100
Explanatory Variable of Interest
Migrant Households, % 1,763 32.44 46.83 0 100
Degree of connectedness within geographical proximity, % 1,763 33.26 26.89 0 100
Degree of connectedness within kinship network, % 1,763 2.75 8.13 0 70
Degree of connectedness within chatting network, % 1,763 4.59 10.96 0 70
Household Head Characteristics
Age, years 1,747 37.62 13.58 15 88
School duration, years 1,760 5.88 4.07 0 17
Gender, % 1,763 45.15 49.78 0 100
Household Economic Characteristics
HH expenditure, MZN per day 1,674 128.83 164.02 0 2,380.95
TV, PC or radio ownership, % 1,763 72.83 44.49 0 100
Frequency of religious activities 1,756 3.73 1.01 1 5
Source: Survey by Batista et al (2011)
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2 OLS Outcome Tables
Table 2: OLS Regressions: Interest in Public Issues
Table 2: OLS Regressions: Interest in Public Issues
Table 3: OLS Regression : Inter st in Public Issues
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household 0.233*** 0.229*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.215*** 0.215***











































































Province Gaza 0.634*** 0.620*** 0.544*** 0.537*** 0.580*** 0.576***
(0.0893) (0.0925) (0.0896) (0.0895) (0.0898) (0.0895)
Province Zambezia 0.580*** 0.613*** 0.728*** 0.731*** 0.721*** 0.723***
(0.0957) (0.0963) (0.0793) (0.0793) (0.0792) (0.0793)
Province Cabo
Delgado
0.752*** 0.791*** 0.903*** 0.907*** 0.897*** 0.898***
(0.0954) (0.0961) (0.0780) (0.0782) (0.0780) (0.0780)
Gender -0.239 -0.235 -0.205 -0.206 -0.222 -0.221
(0.236) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237)
Age 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.313*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.313***
(0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0545)
Age^2 0.0128 0.0122 0.0125 0.0126 0.0127 0.0127
(0.00999) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100)
Turnout 2004 -0.0000837 -0.0000768 -0.0000778 -0.0000785 -0.0000806 -0.0000813
(0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000113)
Expenditure 0.0399*** 0.0396*** 0.0404*** 0.0404*** 0.0397*** 0.0397***
(0.00763) (0.00763) (0.00765) (0.00765) (0.00766) (0.00766)
Years of Schooling -0.0000977 -0.0000967 -0.000116 -0.000118 -0.000116 -0.000116
(0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000164)
Religious Activities 0.00185 0.00179 0.00475 0.00403 0.00737 0.00665
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261)
Access to Media 0.108* 0.113* 0.110* 0.113* 0.106* 0.108*
(0.0613) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0614) (0.0616)
Constant 1.783*** 1.750*** 1.556*** 1.553*** 1.564*** 1.564***
(0.266) (0.266) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253)
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3: OLS Regressions: Preference for Single Party Systems
Table 3: OLS Regressions: Preference for Single Party Systems
Table 4: OLS Regressions: Pref rence for Single Party Systems
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household -0.257** -0.249** -0.246** -0.258** -0.222** -0.231**






























































Province Gaza -0.625*** -0.653*** -0.586*** -0.551*** -0.517*** -0.504***
(0.156) (0.162) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157)
Province Zambezia 0.674*** 0.671*** 0.504*** 0.491*** 0.495*** 0.483***
(0.165) (0.166) (0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Province Cabo
Delgado
-0.806*** -0.808*** -0.981*** -1.002*** -0.989*** -0.998***
(0.162) (0.164) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)
Gender 0.149 0.141 0.142 0.111 0.103 0.108
(0.407) (0.407) (0.408) (0.406) (0.408) (0.407)
Age 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.261*** 0.255*** 0.265*** 0.265***
(0.0932) (0.0933) (0.0932) (0.0930) (0.0933) (0.0931)
Age^2 -0.0217 -0.0215 -0.0217 -0.0216 -0.0211 -0.0225
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171)
Turnout 2004 0.000309 0.000308 0.000308 0.000305 0.000300 0.000317
(0.000193) (0.000193) (0.000193) (0.000192) (0.000193) (0.000193)
Expenditure 0.0593*** 0.0601*** 0.0603*** 0.0605*** 0.0591*** 0.0597***
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0131)
Years of Schooling 0.000584** 0.000578** 0.000607** 0.000603** 0.000600** 0.000599**
(0.000275) (0.000275) (0.000275) (0.000274) (0.000275) (0.000274)
Religious Activities -0.0947** -0.0963** -0.104** -0.105** -0.0994** -0.0967**
(0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0447)
Access to Media 0.0588 0.0643 0.0628 0.0609 0.0537 0.0460
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Constant 3.714*** 3.731*** 3.976*** 3.997*** 3.985*** 4.006***
(0.456) (0.457) (0.433) (0.432) (0.433) (0.432)
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: OLS Regressions: Demand for Political AccountabilityTable 5: OLS Regressions: De nd for Political A countability
Coefficients
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant Household -0.0311 -0.0313 -0.0415 -0.0411 -0.0380 -0.0366






























































Province Gaza 0.118*** 0.0957** 0.0891** 0.0799* 0.0977** 0.0958**
(0.0415) (0.0424) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0429) (0.0426)
Province Zambezia -0.0194 0.00529 0.0160 0.0195 0.0130 0.0153
(0.0450) (0.0448) (0.0367) (0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0367)
Province Cabo
Delgado
-0.0164 0.0116 0.0202 0.0259 0.0178 0.0193
(0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0357)
Gender -0.0441 -0.0508 -0.0273 -0.0225 -0.0318 -0.0347
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
Age -0.000455 0.000150 0.000243 0.00203 0.000129 0.0000695
(0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0251)
Age^2 0.0124*** 0.0113** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0124***
(0.00454) (0.00452) (0.00455) (0.00454) (0.00456) (0.00455)
Turnout 2004 -0.000149*** -0.000136*** -0.000147*** -0.000148*** -0.000147*** -0.000150***
(0.0000508) (0.0000506) (0.0000508) (0.0000508) (0.0000510) (0.0000509)
Expenditure 0.00758** 0.00768** 0.00787** 0.00785** 0.00774** 0.00765**
(0.00351) (0.00349) (0.00352) (0.00352) (0.00353) (0.00352)
Years of Schooling 0.0000821 0.0000762 0.0000799 0.0000804 0.0000817 0.0000811
(0.0000822) (0.0000817) (0.0000822) (0.0000821) (0.0000823) (0.0000822)
Religious Activities 0.0263** 0.0250** 0.0262** 0.0253** 0.0271** 0.0262**
(0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Access to Media 0.00331 0.0144 0.00479 0.00685 0.00346 0.00532
(0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0280)
Constant -0.167 -0.167 -0.222* -0.225* -0.218* -0.218*
(0.123) (0.122) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
Observations 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3 Instrumental Variable Outcome Tables
Table 5: IV Estimation: Interest in Public Issues
Coefficients















Province 0.389*** 0.650*** 0.333*** 0.317***
(0.0492) (0.133) (0.0302) (0.0278)
Gender 0.288*** 0.408*** 0.329*** 0.294***
(0.0580) (0.0685) (0.0583) (0.0618)
Age 0.0140 0.0159 0.0124 0.00568
(0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Age^2 -0.000100 -0.000107 -0.0000732 -0.00000524
(0.000114) (0.000124) (0.000120) (0.000119)
Turnout 2004 0.0477 -0.464 -0.159 -0.148
(0.221) (0.356) (0.270) (0.280)
Expenditure -0.000239 -0.000359* -0.000171 -0.0000937
(0.000167) (0.000206) (0.000189) (0.000194)
Years of Schooling 0.0370*** 0.0318*** 0.0442*** 0.0480***
(0.00758) (0.00852) (0.00842) (0.00916)
Religious Activities 0.0166 0.0649* -0.0150 -0.00422
(0.0287) (0.0385) (0.0300) (0.0309)
Access to Media 0.0780 0.0869 0.153** 0.131*
(0.0657) (0.0726) (0.0698) (0.0718)
Constant 0.836** -0.475 1.138*** 1.305***
(0.334) (0.715) (0.294) (0.286)
Instrumental
Variables
Storm Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought
Birthyear&Plague Min Distance War Min Distance War Min Distance War
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Weak Ident (K-P
F)
25.255 22.197 42.081 38.569
Hansen J (P-value) 0.8835 0.7033 0.7986 0.7209
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: IV Estimation: Preference for Single-Party Systems
Coefficients















Province -0.868*** -0.924*** -0.547*** -0.459***
(0.121) (0.0989) (0.0883) (0.0799)
Gender 0.548*** 0.209* 0.390** 0.639***
(0.145) (0.108) (0.173) (0.207)
Age -0.0364 -0.0293 -0.0372 0.0104
(0.0282) (0.0196) (0.0324) (0.0347)
Age^2 0.000494 0.000368* 0.000464 -0.0000442
(0.000326) (0.000221) (0.000368) (0.000394)
Turnout 2004 1.640*** 1.715*** 2.648*** 3.002***
(0.569) (0.439) (0.821) (0.981)
Expenditure 0.00165*** 0.00102*** 0.00118* 0.000711
(0.000467) (0.000335) (0.000631) (0.000679)
Years of Schooling 0.00982 0.0400*** -0.0220 -0.0561**
(0.0190) (0.0138) (0.0222) (0.0254)
Religious Activities -0.175** -0.170*** 0.0627 -0.00170
(0.0744) (0.0549) (0.0870) (0.103)
Access to Media 0.281 0.0219 -0.354 -0.203
(0.171) (0.123) (0.222) (0.252)
Constant 7.307*** 7.647*** 5.617*** 4.479***
(0.856) (0.683) (0.881) (0.877)
Instrumental
Variables
Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&Storm Birthyear&Storm
Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456
Weak Ident (K-P
F)
37.974 155.951 23.088 20.108
Hansen J (P-value) 0.9289 0.9697 0.3929 0.6382
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: IV Estimation: Demand for Political Accountability
Coefficient















Province 0.0486** 0.0708** 0.0210* 0.0181
(0.0237) (0.0322) (0.0125) (0.0118)
Gender -0.0134 0.0122 -0.00353 -0.0109
(0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0251) (0.0256)
Age 0.0137*** 0.0131*** 0.0119*** 0.0105***
(0.00429) (0.00409) (0.00394) (0.00401)
Age^2 -0.000166*** -0.000155*** -0.000144*** -0.000130***
(0.0000452) (0.0000417) (0.0000404) (0.0000413)
Turnout 2004 0.00636 -0.0211 0.00885 0.00619
(0.115) (0.117) (0.113) (0.116)
Expenditure -0.00000329 0.0000445 0.0000564 0.0000747
(0.000104) (0.0000896) (0.0000917) (0.0000908)
Years of Schooling 0.00826** 0.00695** 0.00923** 0.0102**
(0.00375) (0.00353) (0.00388) (0.00428)
Religious Activities 0.0323*** 0.0352*** 0.0227** 0.0250**
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Access to Media -0.00355 0.00231 0.0103 0.00473
(0.0284) (0.0276) (0.0278) (0.0275)
Constant -0.458*** -0.567*** -0.295*** -0.262**
(0.157) (0.194) (0.110) (0.108)
Instrumental
Variables
Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought Birthyear&Drought
Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague Birthyear&Plague
Observations 1048 1048 1048 1048
Weak Ident (K-P
F)
19.750 44.731 47.281 38.690
Hansen J (P-value) 0.6186 0.7756 0.2751 0.2117
Standard errors in parentheses
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